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OPINION OF THE COURT
                      
IRENAS, Senior District Judge.
Robert Perry DeHart (“DeHart”) is
an inmate at SCI-Greene (“the Prison”), a
Pennsylvania state correctional facility.
He is serving a life sentence for murder, as
well as shorter consecutive sentences for
robbery, burglary and escape, and has been
incarcerated in the state correctional
system since 1980.  He brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
M a r t i n  H o r n ,  P e n n s y l v a n i a ’ s
Commissioner of Corrections, and James
S. Price, the Superintendent of the Prison
(“Appellees”), alleging that his Free
Exercise and Equal Protection rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments
were violated by the Prison’s refusal to
provide him with a diet comporting with
his Buddhist beliefs.  DeHart also brought
a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C. § § 2000cc et seq. (2000)
(“RLUIPA”).  The District Court of the
Western District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment for the Appellees on
DeHart’s constitutional claims, and
dismissed his RLUIPA claim for failure to
comply with the exhaustion requirement of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  We affirm the
District Court’s grant of summary
judgment as to the constitutional claims
and reverse the dismissal of DeHart’s
RLUIPA claim. 
I.
DeHart is a practitioner of Mahayana
Buddhism, a religion to which he was
introduced while a prisoner.  He has
practiced his religion daily since early
1990, although his interest in and study of
Buddhism dates back to the early 1980s.
He meditates and recites mantras for up to
five hours a day and corresponds with the
City of Ten Thousand Buddhas, a religious
organization located in Talmadge,
California.  According to DeHart’s self-
taught understanding of Buddhist religious
texts, he is not permitted to eat any meat or
dairy products, nor can he have foods
containing “pungent vegetables” such as
onions, garlic, leeks, shallots and chives.
As a result, DeHart became a vegetarian in
1989, and began declining food trays
containing meat in 1993.  When he does
accept food trays, he eats only fruit, certain
cereals, salads when served without
dressing, and vegetables served with
margarine.  DeHart supplements his meals
with  i tems purc hase d fro m the
commissary, including peanut butter,
peanuts, pretzels, potato chips, caramel
popcorn, and trail mix.  He requests that
the Prison provide him with a diet free of
meat, dairy products and pungent
3vegetables.
The legal issues related to DeHart’s
request are best understood against the
background of the system employed to
feed prisoners in Pennsylvania’s
correctional facilities.  Inmates receive
standardized meals prepared pursuant to a
master menu, which is designed to provide
all of an inmate’s daily nutritional
requirements.  Food for the inmates is
purchased and prepared in bulk.  Inmates
are given limited choice in what appears
on their food trays; they are able to decline
pork products and elect to receive an
alternative protein source, such as tofu or
a bean burger, when available.  The only
deviations from the mass production of
meals are for inmates with health
conditions necessitating therapeutic dietary
modifications and inmates with particular
religious dietary restrictions.  Doctors
prescribe a variety of therapeutic diets, and
the master menu includes seven different
menus for diabetic inmates, sodium and fat
restricted menus, and a menu for inmates
with renal problems.   Jewish inmates who
adhere to a kosher diet receive special
meals in the form of a “cold kosher bag,”
which contain raw fruits and vegetables,
Ensure® dietary supplements, pretzels,
crackers, coffee and granola.  Muslim
inmates receive special meals in their cells
during Ramadan, when they observe a
daylight fast.  The Prison provides a post-
sunset evening meal after the normal
supper hour and a breakfast bag, called a
“Sahoora Bag,” to be eaten before sunrise.
As a result of concerns about food
spoilage and serving temperature, the
Sahoora Bag contains some items not
served on that day’s master menu.  Special
items for the therapeutic and religious
diets are purchased through the medical
department and prison commissary.
DeHart submitted a written grievance to
the Prison on June 17, 1995, requesting a
diet free of “animal products and by-
products”consistent with his religious
beliefs.1   After his request for a vegan2
diet was denied, DeHart unsuccessfully
appealed his request to Superintendent
Price and the Department of Corrections
Central Office Review Committee. He also
sent a letter to Commissioner Horn
outlining his religious dietary restrictions,
dated July 1, 1995.  After completing the
appeals process within the Department of
Corrections, DeHart filed this suit,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the
    1DeHart also filed an official
grievance objecting to the use of butter in
the preparation of vegetables a month
before, although he did not mention the
religious basis for his complaint.  DeHart
first raised the issue of his religious
beliefs in a written letter to
Superintendent James Price dated May
22, 1995, in which he specifically
mentioned that his Buddhist beliefs
prohibited the consumption of meat,
dairy and pungent vegetables.  
    2DeHart’s proposed diet is referred to
in the briefs and court documents
alternately as a vegetarian and a vegan
diet.  Because he refuses to eat meat, fish
and dairy products, we will use the term
vegan to describe his dietary preferences.
4Western District of Pennsylvania.
This appeal marks DeHart’s third
appearance before this Court.  In his first
appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s
denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
DeHart v. Horn, 127 F.3d 1094 (3d Cir.
1997) (mem.) (“DeHart I”).  The District
Court held that DeHart’s request for a
preliminary injunction should be denied on
the ground that keeping a vegan diet was
not a command of Buddhism.  Despite
upholding the result, this Court
emphasized that the District Court should
not determine “whether [DeHart’s] beliefs
are doctrinally correct or central to a
particular school of Buddhist teaching.” Id.
at 2.  
We next heard DeHart’s appeal of the
District Court’s first grant of summary
judgment for the Appellees.  The District
Court held that the Prison’s policy of
denying individual dietary requests of
inmates was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest under the
standard set out in Turner v. Safely, 482
U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64
(1987).3  After the decision of a panel to
reverse the District Court’s judgment,
DeHart’s appeal was reheard en banc.
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (2000) (en
banc) (“DeHart II”).  This Court reversed
the lower court’s judgment and remanded
for reconsideration of the second, third and
fourth Turner factors.  Id.  In doing so, we
overruled the distinction drawn by our
decision in Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276
(3d Cir. 1998), between religious
commandments and positive expressions
of belief.  227 F.3d at 54.  Specifically, we
ordered the lower court to reconsider
whether DeHart retained other means of
exercising his religious beliefs in light of
our overruling Johnson.  Id.  We also
asked the District Court to assess the
impact of granting DeHart’s request for a
meat and dairy-free diet on the prison
community in light of the accommodations
made to Jewish inmates adhering to the
kosher dietary rules.  Id. at 58-59.  With
respect to DeHart’s Equal Protection
claim, we emphasized that our overruling
of Johnson required Appellees to offer a
legitimate penological reason for treating
DeHart differently than Jewish inmates
other than simply drawing a line between
inmates with orthodox and non-orthodox
religious beliefs.  Id. at 61.
On remand after DeHart II, the District
Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation to grant summary
judgment for Appellees.  DeHart v. Horn,
No. 95-1238 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2003).
The District Court rejected Appellees’
argument that DeHart’s beliefs were not
sincere and religious in nature.  See Magis.
Rep. & Rec. on Mot. for Summ. J., at R.R.
19a-24a.4  The lower court concluded that
the second Turner factor weighed in favor
of the Prison because DeHart had more
than adequate alternative means of
    3The Turner factors are outlined and
discussed infra Part III.
    4We use the notation “R.R.” to
designate page numbers in the
Reproduced Record.
5expressing his religious beliefs:  he was
permitted to meditate, recite the Sutras
(Buddhist religious texts), correspond with
the City of Ten Thousand Buddhas,
purchase canvas sneakers instead of
leather, have Buddhist materials sent to
him from outside the prison and have a
Buddhist religious advisor visit him in
prison.  See id. at R.R. 25a-26a.  With
regard to the third Turner factor, the
District Court found that the dietary
accommodation proposed by DeHart was
much more burdensome than what was
provided to Jewish and Muslim inmates
because his  diet  would require
individualized preparation of meals and
special ordering of food items not on the
master menu.  See id. at R.R. 26a-34a.
The lower court concluded that DeHart’s
d ie ta ry r eques ts  could  no t  b e
accommodated without imposing more
than a de minimis cost on the Prison. See
id. at R.R. 34a-36a.
DeHart’s complaint, as initially filed,
also claimed that his right to freely
exercise his religious beliefs had been
impaired in violation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § §
2000bb et seq. (1993) (“RFRA”).  In City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117
S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed. 624 (1997), the
Sup reme Cour t dec la r ed  RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to the States,
and DeHart’s claim was extinguished.
After DeHart II and before the lower
court’s decision on remand, RLUIPA was
enacted as a replacement for RFRA.
DeHart was granted leave to amend his
complaint to state a claim under the new
statute.  DeHart v. Horn, No. 95-1238
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2001).  However, in a
separate order, the District Court adopted
t h e  M a g i s t r a t e ’ s  R e p o r t  a n d
Recommendation that DeHart’s RLUIPA
claim be dismissed for failure to exhaust
all administrative remedies as required by
42 U.S.C. § 1997e.  DeHart v. Horn, No.
95-1238 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2003).  The
District Court concluded that RLUIPA
adopted a different substantive standard of
review for prisoner religious freedom
claims than RFRA.  See Magis. Rep. &
Rec. on Mot. to Dismiss, at R.R. 44a.
Therefore, because DeHart presented his
claim to the prison grievance process
while RFRA provided the applicable
standard, his claim was no longer
exhausted now that it was based on
RLUIPA.  See id. at R.R. 46a.  
DeHart appeals both the grant of
summary judgment on his First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims and the
dismissal of his RLUIPA claim.
II.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review
of a district court’s grant of summary
judgment is plenary and we employ the
same standard as applied below.  United
States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, 382 F.3d
432, 436 (3d Cir. 2004).  A district court
may grant summary judgment when there
is no genuine issue of material fact to be
resolved at trial and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
6that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).  The substantive law
governing the dispute will determine
which facts are material, and only disputes
over those facts “that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “In
reviewing the grant of summary judgment,
we must affirm if the record evidence
submitted by the non-movant ‘is merely
colorable or is no t significantly
probative.’” Port Auth. of New York &
New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311
F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2002).  
III.
A.
In Turner v. Safely the Supreme Court
identified the crucial balance in assessing
inmates’ claims that their constitutional
rights were violated by prison regulations.
While “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution. . . . ‘the
problems of prisons in America are
complex and intractable, and, more to the
point, they are not readily susceptible of
resolution by decree.’” 482 U.S. at 84
(quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 404-405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d
224 (1974)).  Recognizing this tension in
principles, Turner established the standard
of review for prisoner constitutional
claims:  “when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.”
Id. at 89.  We elaborated in DeHart II that:
[T]his standard of review requires a
court to respect the security,
rehabilitation and administrative
concerns underlying a prison
regulation, without requiring proof
that the regulation is the least
restrictive means of addressing those
concerns, it also requires a court to
give weight, in assessing the overall
reasonableness of regulations, to the
inmate’s interest in engaging in
constitutionally protected activity.
227 F.3d at 51.  Thus, DeHart’s appeal
forces us to resolve the tension between a
court’s duty to redress constitutional
violations resulting from neutral prison
regulations and its obligation not to
unreasonably interfere with the complex
issues involved in managing the day-to-
day activities of a prison.
Turner articulated a four factor test for
determining whether a prison regulation is
reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.  482 U.S. at 79.  As
we explained in Waterman v. Farmer, 183
F.3d 208, 213 n.6 (1999) (citation
omitted):
[Turner] requires courts to consider
(1) whether a rational connection
exists between the regulation and a
neutral, legitimate government
interest;5 (2) whether alternative
    5In DeHart II we upheld the District
Court’s finding that this factor favored
the Prison.  We held that a prison’s
7means exist for inmates to exercise
the constitutional right at issue; (3)
what impact the accommodation of
the right would have on inmates,
prison personnel, and allocation of
prison resources; and (4) whether
obvious, easy alternatives exist.
We cautioned in DeHart II that this
approach “does not call for placing each
factor in one of two columns and tallying
a numerical result,” but that assessing the
reasonableness of a prison regulation
requires consideration of all the evidence
in the record.  227 F.3d at 59.6
When we reversed the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in DeHart II,
we directed the lower court to reevaluate
its findings on the second,7 third and
fourth Turner factors.  227 F.3d at 57-59.
Specifically, we asked the District Court to
assess the potential impact on the prison
community of granting DeHart’s request
for a special diet comporting with his
religious beliefs in light of the prison
system’s experience with providing other
religious diets.  Id. at 58.  We also asked
the lower court to reexamine whether
DeHart’s religious dietary restrictions
could be accommodated in such a way as
to impose only a de minimis cost on the
Prison.  Id.  We noted that “the
defendants’ treatment of Jewish inmates,
in the absence of some further explanation,
casts substantial doubt on their assertion
that accommodating DeHart’s request
would result in significant problems for
the prison community.”  Id.  We are
satisfied that the District Court on remand
properly considered the impact on other
inmates, guards and the prison
administration of providing of religious
diets for adherents of other faiths, and we
agree that the third Turner factor favors
the Prison.  While neither party separately
addressed the lower court’s findings on the
fourth Turner factor in this appeal, we are
also satisfied with the District Court’s
interests in an efficient food system and
in avoiding inmate jealousy were
legitimate penological concerns.  227
F.3d at 53.  Additionally, the Prison’s
refusal to provide DeHart with a
religious diet bore some rational relation
to that interest.  Id.
    6In DeHart II we explained that
Turner was equally applicable to
DeHart’s Free Exercise and Equal
Protection claims, and that the analysis
significantly overlapped. 227 F.3d at 61.
    7We instructed the lower court to
reconsider its analysis of the second
Turner factor on remand in light of our
decision to overrule Johnson.  227 F.3d
at 54.  The District Court subsequently
held that this factor also favored the
Prison, as DeHart was able to express his
Buddhist beliefs through meditation,
correspondence with Buddhist religious
organizations, and through the purchase
of canvas, rather than leather, sneakers,
amongst other accommodations.  See
Magis. Rep. & Rec. on Mot. for Summ.
J., at R.R. 19a-24a.  DeHart has not
appealed this finding, so that only the
third and fourth factors are at issue in
this appeal.
8analysis on that issue.
B.
The third Turner factor requires that we
analyze the impact of accommodating
DeHart’s dietary requests on inmates,
prison personnel, and allocation of prison
resources.  When DeHart II was decided,
DeHart proposed that he be served a diet
created by dietician Karen Avon which
modified serving sizes of items on the
master menu and added soy milk and
whole grain bread as supplements.8  The
Avon diet, however, includes items that
contain pungent vegetables.9  Although
DeHart has repeatedly affirmed the Avon
diet, he has also continued to insist that he
be served no pungent vegetables.10
    8Aff. of Karen Avon, at R.R. 195a-
232a.  Avon includes as an appendix to
her affidavit modifications based on one
week’s master menu. For example, on
Monday inmates were served for supper
egg salad made with one egg yolk, three
egg whites, onion, celery and
mayonnaise, one half cup noodles, one
half cup succotash, one half cup beet and
onion salad, fresh fruit and eight ounces
of skim milk.  Avon proposed that
DeHart be served one half cup of
noodles, one cup succotash, one cup beet
and onion salad, two slices of whole
grain bread, two teaspoons of margarine,
fresh fruit, eight ounces of soy milk and
eight ounces of iced tea.  Id. at R.R.
202a.
    9Margaret Gordon, a clinical dietitian
for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
testified at her deposition that the
following non-meat, non-dairy items
from the master menu contained garlic
and onions: “garden burgers, the chili,
the bean chili, the tofu salad, the stewed
tomatoes, the vegetable soup, . . . , the
bean and pasta casserole, the vegetable
bean soup, . . . , the soy pasta sauce, the
pasta bean soup, . . . , the soy barbeque,
the fried potatoes, the baked beans, . . . ,
and the bean burger.” Dep. of Margaret
Gordon, at R.R. 712a.  Avon’s proposed
menu included stewed tomatoes, baked
beans, and beet and onion salad. Aff. of
Karen Avon, at R.R. 202a-210a.
    10DeHart’s affidavit submitted in
support of his Opposition to the
Appellees’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, which his counsel affirmed
during oral argument, included the
following statements:
4.  I cannot eat dairy products,
pungent vegetables, or meat
products, in any form and follow
my religious beliefs.
5.  I would agree to eat extra
servings of vegetables, and extra
servings of non-meat items such as
tofu, beans, soy milk, and peanut
butter, which are consistent with my
religious beliefs. These items, with
the exception of soy milk, appear in
the main menu offered to all
inmates, nearly every day and are
readily available. They are also
regularly mixed with onions and
garlic, which are prohibited
pungent vegetables.
9DeHart’s proposed diet now appears to be
that he be served extra portions of
vegetables and grains on the master menu,
consistent with the Avon diet, but with the
portions individually prepared to his
dietary specifications.  Alternatively, he
proposes that he receive extra daily
servings of the alternative protein sources
available at the Prison, but specially
prepared without pungent vegetables and
outside of their rotation on the master
menu.  Therefore, to the extent that
DeHart II’s discussion of the third and
fourth Turner factors used the Avon diet
as its comparison point, our prior ruling
provides little guidance for our analysis.
The District Court held that DeHart’s
proposed diet would place a greater burden
on the Prison than the dietary
accommodations granted to Jewish and
Muslim inmates.  See Magis. Rep. & Rec.
on Mot. for Summ. J., at R.R. 30a-36a.
DeHart’s diet would require individualized
preparation of his meals, which is made
more burdensome by the fact that the
Prison’s kitchen was set up only for bulk
food preparation.  Id.  Additionally, it
would require special ordering soy milk,
whole grain bread and extra servings of the
few alternative protein sources DeHart
would eat, all at extra cost to the Prison.
Id.  Secured food storage would be
required in order to prevent theft of the
specially ordered items.  Id.  The District
Court noted that DeHart’s proposed diet
was not nutritionally adequate, and would
require regular nutritional audits by a
contract dietician, also at extra cost to the
Prison.11  Id.  In contrast, the District Court
found that the religious diets provided to
Jewish and Muslim inmates did not require
. . .
7.  Now that the Commonwealth
serves alternate protein sources
such as tofu, peanut butter and
beans, if they were to give me
servings of those items without
pungent vegetables, it would come
far closer to satisfying my
nutritional needs than they do now.
Aff. of Robert P. DeHart, at R.R. 256a-
260a (emphasis added).
    11In DeHart II we directed the District
Court to determine how and if the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
Food Services Administrative Directive
requiring a registered dietician to verify
that the master menu meets or exceeds
the recommended daily nutritional
allowances would apply to DeHart’s
proposed diet.  227 F.3d at 49 n.1.  If the
District Court found that DeHart’s
proposed diet fell short of the nutritional
standards contained in the Administrative
Directive, we indicated that the issue
would remain under Turner whether the
directive was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.  Id. 
Neither party nor the District Court
addressed this question on remand.
However, we recognize the link between
good health and a nutritionally adequate
diet, and note that the prison has a
significant interest in keeping prisoners
healthy, given the costs of medical
treatment and the difficulty in preventing
the spread of illness between prisoners in
close quarters.
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special ordering of items not already
available at the Prison or through the
Prison’s current vendors, nor did they
require individualized preparation of
meals.  Id.
On appeal, DeHart argues that the cold
kosher meals served to Jewish inmates and
the Sahoora bags provided to Muslim
inmates during Ramadan also require
individualized preparation and the serving
of items not appearing, or outside their
rotation, on the master menu.  He contends
that there is no reason why granting his
request would pose any greater burden on
the Prison than other special diets because
individualized preparation is required for
all the therapeutic meals and religious
diets.  Additionally, he argues that his
dietary request is no more likely to lead to
an increase in requests for dietary
accommodations than any of the other
special diets served at the Prison.  
DeHart’s arguments overlook a crucial
distinction.  None of the other special diets
served at the Prison require individualized
preparation and reorganization of the way
prison kitchens prepare food and are
provided to accommodate an inmate’s
religious beliefs.12  Other religious diets
involve supplementing or alternating
regular prison meals with additional foods
already available at the prison.   However,
providing a diet free of pungent vegetables
would mandate that the prison alter the
way it prepares meals.  This problem is
only heightened by DeHart’s failure to put
forward, in specific terms, a diet that
would fit within his restrictions.  While
some of the therapeutic diets include
specially prepared items and foods not
included on the master menu,13 the failure
to provide medically necessary therapeutic
diets puts the health of inmates at risk and
could result in significant medical
expenses.  
With  respect to the dietary
accommodations provided to Jewish
inmates, the cold kosher meals do not
require special ordering of items not
already available at the Prison.  The kosher
meals involve negligible preparation, as
they are uncooked, and in the case of some
fruits and vegetables, uncut as well.  In
fact, the diet DeHart requests bears a
greater resemblance to the hot kosher
meals we declined to require in Johnson.
The Sahoora bags provided to Muslim
inmates require some special preparation
in order to prevent foods in the breakfast
bags from spoiling overnight, and add the
complication of being served outside of
    12There are no inmates receiving the
cold kosher diet at SCI-Greene, so we
compare DeHart’s request to the diet
served to Jewish inmates at SCI-
Pittsburgh.  The record does not specify
exactly how many Muslim inmates there
are at SCI-Greene or in the Pennsylvania
correctional system, but the record
indicates that the number is considerable.
    13For example, the therapeutic diets
include items that do not appear on the
master menu, such as pineapple and
grapefruit juice, apricots, sugar free
beverages, cold cuts, chicken pieces in
broth, pineapple chunks, and applesauce. 
Aff. of Karen Avon, at R.R. 219a-232a.
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normal mealtimes.  However, these
Sahoora bags do not require major changes
to how the prison purchases, stores or
prepares food, in contrast to the special
preparation of single servings sought by
DeHart. 
      With  regard  to the
fourth Turner factor, the District Court
found that there was no alternative that
could fully accommodate DeHart’s
religious dietary restrictions while
imposing only a minimal burden on the
Prison.  See Magis. Rep. & Rec. on Mot.
For Summ. J., at R.R. 34a-36a.  Simply
providing double servings of vegetables
and grains on the master menu, or daily
servings of the available alternative protein
sources, would not meet DeHart’s needs
because they include pungent vegetables,
which he has repeatedly affirmed that he
would not eat.  Id. at R.R. 35a.  Special
ordering of soy milk, whole grain bread
and extra servings of alternative protein
sources is costly and burdensome, as is the
individualized preparation of master menu
items without pungent vegetables.  Id.
DeHart denies that his proposed diet poses
any special burden, but we agree that the
record supports the conclusion that his
religious dietary restrictions cannot be met,
by the menu he suggests or any obvious
and easy alternative, with only a de
minimis cost to the Prison.
In DeHart II we affirmed the District
Court’s conclusion that first Turner factor
favored the Prison, and reversed its
findings as to the second, third and fourth
factors.  On remand, the lower court
determined that those factors also favored
the Prison, a conclusion that we affirm
today.  Although analysis under Turner is
not a mere tabulation of factors, it is clear
from the foregoing analysis that the
Prison’s denial of DeHart’s request for a
diet consistent with his Buddhist beliefs is
reasonably related to the Prison’s
legitimate interest in efficient food
provision.
IV.
As we noted in DeHart II, the analysis
of DeHart’s Equal Protection claim
incorporates much of the discussion of the
third and fourth Turner factors.  227 F.3d
at 61.  In our earlier opinion, we directed
the District Court to reconsider its grant of
summary judgment for Appellees in light
of our invalidation of the distinction drawn
between religious commandments and
positive expressions of belief.  Id.  We
held that “the distinction drawn between
orthodox and non-orthodox believers
cannot justify the refusal of DeHart’s
request” in the absence of some nexus
between this distinction and a legitimate
penological concern.  Id.  On remand and
in this appeal, the Appellees argue instead
that DeHart is not similarly situated to any
group for equal protection purposes
because his request poses a greater burden
than the dietary accommodations given to
Jewish and Muslim inmates.  DeHart
argues that he is similarly situated to
Jewish and Muslim inmates, and again
contests the District Court’s conclusion
that his proposed diet is more burdensome.
However, because we find that the burden
imposed by DeHart’s proposed diet
exceeds the burden imposed by
accommodating Muslim and Jewish
inmates, we affirm the District Court’s
12
grant of summary judgment for Appellees
on DeHart’s Equal Protection claim.14
V.
Subsequent to our decision in DeHart
II, DeHart amended his complaint to state
a claim under the newly enacted Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss
the amended complaint on the ground that
DeHart had not exhausted the prison
administrative grievance process for his
RLUIPA claim.  The District Court
accepted the Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation to dismiss and DeHart
now appeals.15  We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s decision to
grant a motion to dismiss, and to the extent
that our review turns on the statutory
construction of the exhaustion requirement
in Section 1997e(a), our review is also
plenary.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
226 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Section 1997(e)(a) provides that “[n]o
action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under Section 1983 . . .
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other
cor re c t io n a l  f a c i l it y un t i l such
administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(1996).  This stringent exhaustion
requirement was established by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),
replacing language that required prisoners
to exhaust only those “plain, speedy, and
effective remedies as are available.”  Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, § 7(a)
(1980), amended by Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 at 66 (1996).   The PLRA
was enacted with a two-fold purpose: to
limit the number of prison condition
lawsuits then flooding the courts and to
return control over prison policies and
decision-making to local prison officials.
See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-
25, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002).
    14As a result of our conclusion that
DeHart is not similarly situated to any
other group of inmates, there is no need
to consider the Turner factors in
addressing his Equal Protection claim.
    15Although the District Court’s order
does not so specify, we conclude that the 
dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies was with
prejudice, and therefore final and
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Plaintiff has never argued that the
dismissal should be without prejudice,
but instead contends that exhaustion is
not required.  In essence, the lower
court’s ruling was an adjudication on the
merits of his contention because it
addressed the question of whether
RLUIPA so altered the standard of
review as to require re-exhaustion of
claims grieved under RFRA.  Plaintiff
has elected to stand on his dismissed
complaint, rather than attempt to exhaust
his RLUIPA claim.  As a result, the order
is appealable.  See Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.
1995); Borelli v City of Reading, 532
F.3d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).
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This Court has repeatedly held that
Section 1997e(a) makes exhaustion of
prison administrative remedies mandatory,
regardless of the efficacy of the grievance
process.  See, e.g.,  Nyhuis v. Reno, 204
F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
“the PLRA amended § 1997e(a) in such a
way as to make exhaustion of all
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e m e d i e s
mandatory–whether or not they provide the
inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he
desires”);  Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289
(3d Cir. 2000) (finding exhaustion
mandatory in Eighth Amendment claim
brought by prisoner under § 1983 even
though plaintiff sought monetary
damages), aff’d 532 U.S. 731 (2001).  We
held that an across-the-board, mandatory
exhaustion requirement serves the
underlying policies of the PLRA,
including:
(1) avoiding premature interruption
of the administrative process and
giving the agency a chance to
discover and correct its own errors;
(2) conserving scarce judicial
resources, since the complaining
party may be successful in
vindicating his rights in the
administrative process and the courts
may never have to intervene; and (3)
improving the efficacy of the
administrative process.
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 75.  Although we
rejected a judicially-created futility
exception to the exhaustion requirement in
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71, we have never held
that a prisoner must exhaust his claims
more than once.
Appellees argue that DeHart has not
given the Prison an opportunity to address
his claim under what they assert is a new
substantive standard contained in
RLUIPA, and as a result, the District
Court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is proper.
Appellees have never contended that
DeHart did not exhaust all the available
administrative remedies when the claim
was brought under RLUIPA’s predecessor,
RFRA.  In fact, DeHart’s suit predates the
PLRA, and therefore he is not required to
exhaust all remedies under the PLRA’s
stringent standard.  It is clear from the
record that prior to filing suit, DeHart
exhausted all the administrative remedies
available to him in seeking a diet that
comported with his religious beliefs.  The
issue is then whether RLUIPA and RFRA
are sufficiently different as to justify
requiring DeHart to present his claim for a
second time to the prison grievance
process.  Because we disagree with
Appellees’ contention that RLUIPA
enacted a new substantive standard of
review for prisoner religious claims, we
hold that DeHart has satisfied the
exhaustion requirement of Section
1997e(a) and may proceed with his
RLUIPA claim.    
RFRA provided that “[g]overnment
shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden
results  from a ru le of gene ral
applicability.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)
(1993).  RFRA included an exception to its
blanket rule:  “Government may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that
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application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest, and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  
RFRA had been passed in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, in which
the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny
to a facially neutral, generally applicable
law that incidentally burdened members of
a particular religious group.  494 U.S. 872,
110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).
In doing so, the Court held that application
of the compelling government interest test
it set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965
(1963), would have created the “anomaly”
of a “constitutional right to ignore neutral
laws of general applicability.”  City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513 (citing Smith, 494
U.S. at 885).  The Congressional findings
accompanying R F R A  spec ifically
repudiated the Court’s decision in Smith,
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), with
Congress stating that the purpose of RFRA
was “to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise
of religion is substantially burdened.”  42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court
overturned RFRA as it applied to the
States.  It held that Congress had exceeded
the scope of its enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting RFRA.  The Court concluded that
RFRA was an impermissible attempt to
change substantive constitutional law
rather than remedy constitu tional
violations, given the broad scope of the
Act, its applicability to the States, and the
lack of evidence of First Amendment
violations on par with the type of
widespread abuse as demonstrated in
support of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530, 532. 
Following the decision in City of
Boerne, Congress attempted to preserve
RFR A’s  com pelling  governm enta l
interest/least restrictive means test by
recasting it in a form that could avoid the
fatal constitutional problems of that
statute.  The result of this effort, RLUIPA,
essentially reiterates the language of
RFRA as it applies to institutionalized
persons:
No government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution, as defined
in section 1997 of this title, even if
the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that
person–
 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of
f u r t h e ri n g  t h a t  c o m p e l l i n g
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000).  Congress
was explicit in its intent to replicate in
RLUIPA the substantive portions of
RFRA.  146 Cong. Rec. E1563-01 (daily
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ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Canady) (“[Section 2000cc-1(a)] applies
the RFRA standard to protect the religious
exercise of persons residing in or confined
to institutions”); 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (“[RLUIPA]
applies the standard of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act”).
Contrary to the position of Appellees
and the District Court, it cannot be argued
that RLUIPA does not apply the same
standard to prisoner free exercise claims as
did RFRA.  The statutory language is
nearly identical, and statements by
RLUIPA’s sponsors in the Congressional
Record indicate that the legislative intent
was to reenact RFRA in constitutional
form.16  See 146 Cong. Rec. E1563-01;
146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01.  RLUIPA
makes two fundamental changes to RFRA.
First, it pares the scope of the legislation
from RFRA’s broad applicability down to
only land use issues and claims by
institutionalized persons.  Compare 42
U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (“Government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability . . .”), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc (“No government shall
impose or implement a land use regulation
in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a
person . . .”), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1
(“No government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, . . . , even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability. . .”).
Second, it shifts the source of Congress’
power to pass the Act.  While RFRA was
styled as an expression of congressional
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, RLUIPA was enacted
pursuant to Congress’ powers under the
Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
1, and the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(b) (“This section applies in any case in
which – (1) the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance; or (2)
the substantial burden affects, or removal
of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes.”).
RLUIPA makes no change to the standard
by which prisoners’ free exercise claims
are reviewed. 
The District Court’s reliance on Wilson
v. Moore, No. 4:01CV158-RV, 2002 WL
    16Appellees raised the question of
RLUIPA’s constitutionality before the
District Court, but the issue was mooted
by the District Court’s holding that
DeHart had not exhausted his RLUIPA
claim.  The United States of America
joined this case as an intervenor to
defend the constitutionality of RLUIPA
before the District Court.  The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in a case
raising this issue.  See Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause), cert. granted, 73
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (No.
03-9877).  The constitutionality of
RLUIPA may be an issue on remand to
the District Court. 
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950062 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2002), is in
error.  In Wilson, the Northern District of
Florida dismissed several claims made by
the plaintiff, an inmate in a Florida state
correctional facility, on the ground that the
plaintiff had not exhausted his claims
under the new RLUIPA standard, even
though the claims were filed before
RLUIPA was enacted.  The crucial
difference between Wilson and the instant
case is that DeHart exhausted his free
exercise claim under RFRA, which applied
the same standard as contained in
RLUIPA, whereas in Wilson, the
plaintiff’s grievances were filed well after
RFRA was declared unconstitutional.  See
Wilson, 2002 WL 950062, at *3-4 (noting
that plaintiff filed grievances on July 10,
Aug. 21, Aug. 22, Dec. 18, and Dec. 25,
2000).  As a result, the prison reviewed the
Wilson plaintiff’s claim under the pre-
RFRA standard employed in Smith and
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107
S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), which
applied the Turner reasonableness test to
prisoner free exercise claims.  Wilson,
2002 WL 950062, at *5.  The actual
holding of Wilson is that RLUIPA
substantively changed the standard of
review from what it was before RFRA was
passed and after RFRA was declared
unconstitutional, and not, as the lower
court and Appellees suggest, from the
standard contained in RFRA itself.
DeHart is not required to re-exhaust his
RLUIPA claim.  He appropriately
presented his grievance to the Prison under
the identical standard before commencing
the instant lawsuit in 1995.  The Prison has
had its opportunity to correct its own
errors under the compelling interest/least
restrictive alternative test of RFRA and
RLUIPA.  Forcing DeHart to present the
same claim under the same standard as a
prerequisite to judicial review of his
RLUIPA claim is unnecessary and serves
none of the purposes of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
of the District Court with respect to
DeHart’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims will be affirmed.  The judgment of
the District Court with respect to DeHart’s
claim under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act will be
reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
